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Which Social Media Facilitate Online Public Opinion
in China?
Daniela Stockmann1 and Ting Luo2
1Hertie School of Governance, Berlin, Germany
2Department of Political Science, Leiden University, Leiden, The Netherlands
Why does online public opinion emerge in some social media more easily than in others? Building
on research on authoritarian deliberation, we describe spaces for political discussion in Chinese
cyberspace in terms of interactivity, which results in different forms of political discussion.
Drawing on semi-structured qualitative expert interviews with information and communications
technology professionals at Tencent, Weibo, and Baidu, we explain howmajor social media differ
in terms of their structure and the company’s motivation. We specify which features are more
likely to facilitate the emergence of online public opinion in Chinese social media and provide
preliminary evidence from 92 semi-structured interviews with Internet users.
INTRODUCTION
In August 2015, at the harbor in Tianjin, 800 tons of
chemicals exploded. Residents of Tianjin took pictures and
videos with their mobile phones and posted them on the
Internet. Once posted online, the images were picked up by
market-based media that brought the information to the
center of public discourse. In most liberal democracies,
online discourse about such an event would be taken for
granted, but this was not the case in China, where political
views could be voiced in private but not publicized in media
—until the digital age. New media have facilitated the rise
of online public opinion, whereby stories discussed on the
Web may suddenly be funneled into the public discourse.
Social media can exert great pressure on the regime to
become responsive. For example, after the Tianjin explosion,
President Xi Jinping called for urgent nationwide checks on
dangerous chemicals and reviews of workplace safety, and
Premier Li Keqiang visited the scene to investigate the situation.
The former vice mayor of Tianjin, Yang Dongliang, at the time
a member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist
Party and director of the State Administration for Work Safety,
was sacked for suspected “serious breaches of discipline and the
law.” Another eleven government and port ofﬁcials were pro-
secuted for their negligence over the massive explosions. Reilly
(2012) has demonstrated that such public pressures limit the
policy options that the central leadership takes under considera-
tion, affect negotiating strategy, shape ofﬁcial rhetoric and pub-
lic debate over policy, and affect the timing and direction of
speciﬁc policy choices (Meng, Pan, and Yang, 2014)
To a certain extent, online discussion of public affairs is
tolerated and even actively promoted by the Chinese state.
Chinese public ofﬁcials are using online discussion as a
means to obtain feedback concerning the policies and
goals of the government (Hartford 2005, Jiang and Xu
2009) and to monitor and control the actions of local ofﬁ-
cials (Hassid 2012). The Chinese state is actively building
and promoting public deliberative forums on which it
invites citizens to provide feedback and make policy sug-
gestions. Someone who does not closely follow China’s
Internet scene might be very surprised to learn about some
of the comments people are allowed to post, covering a
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range of topics including local corruption, the environment,
or ﬁnancial policies (MacKinnon 2012).
At the same time, the state also builds structures that
function as a “safety belt” to control the content of the
discussion and guide it in a direction supportive of the
goals and policies of the authoritarian rulers, if necessary.
China has built an extensive system for Internet surveillance
and manipulation. This system includes conﬁguration of
Internet gateway infrastructure (Boas 2006), blocking web-
sites and ﬁltering (Chase and Mulvenon 2002), Internet
policing (Brady 2008), regulation of Internet service provi-
ders (MacKinnon 2009), and suppression of dissident use
and discipline of cyber cafes (Chase and Mulvenon 2002;
Qiu 2000). As the state is clamping down on online public
opinion, Internet users have grown savvy at expressing
themselves through political satire and ironic uses of politi-
cally correct language to subvert controls (Yang 2009;
Esarey and Xiao 2008).
Increasingly, the Chinese state has moved away from using
coercive means and toward using softer means of control.
While media companies are embedded into the state infra-
structure, censorship is in practice outsourced to companies
and users (MacKinnon 2012; Morozov 2011). An army of web
commentators disguised as ordinary netizens shape and alter
online public discourse (Bandurski 2008). Under Xi Jinping,
party and state units have been building online portals and apps
that encourage users to connect to an emerging e-governance
system. In doing so, the state is occupying space for online
discussion and coopting online public opinion (Han 2015).
While most of the discussion of the Chinese Internet has
focused on the ways in which the Chinese state directly
shapes and manipulates cyberspace, here we focus on subtle
ways that seem apolitical on the surface but have important
consequences for politics. While traditional media assume
communication between a sender and a receiver, the Internet
is by deﬁnition interactive. The interactive features of social
media platforms structure public discourse and facilitate the
development of online opinion in different ways. Taking an
inductive approach, we conducted semi-structured inter-
views with twenty academics and product managers of the
social media companies Tencent, Weibo, and Baidu between
January and May 2015. Drawing on insights from these
experts, our main aim is to conceptualize the structures
shaping the expression of opinions on public affairs,
which we refer to as online public opinion. By comparing
Weibo, WeChat, and Baidu Tieba as the three most popular
social media in China, we demonstrate that social media are
created with a business goal in mind, but optimizing the
platform toward one general core function creates an envir-
onment that fosters certain kinds of political behavior. We
then hypothesize and provide preliminary evidence from 92
semi-structured interviews with Internet users that the
Twitter-like Weibo has the potential to directly challenge
state autonomy over information and therefore facilitates the
rise of information cascades most strongly, while Tieba and
WeChat’s potential concentrates on aiding in the formation
of opinions and incubating issues that may then be dissemi-
nated via other social media platforms. Social media provide
opportunities for politically motivated users to capture the
platform for political purposes. Where and when public
opinion forms and spreads in Chinese cyberspace has
important implications for the pressure the Internet exerts
on policymakers.
The Chinese state outsources the design of these interac-
tive features to commercial companies, which by deﬁnition
makes politics harder to detect, but by investigating the
incentives built into the design, we tease out their relevance
for information processing and the expression of opinions
about public affairs. These incentives are intended to increase
proﬁt, but have unintended consequences for the develop-
ment of online public opinion. Political considerations enter
the design of social media platforms indirectly as commercial
companies anticipate how technological designs ﬁt with the
broader strategy toward managing online public opinion.
INFORMAL POLITICAL TALK AND ONLINE
ACTIVISM
Most social media are designed for other purposes than for
political talk; in practice, however, many users use digital
technology to share news, post political messages, and
comment on issues of relevance to public policies. While
most scholars would likely agree that attention to news
does not constitute participation per se, political discussion
or talk occupies something of a “gray” area. For example,
Delli Carpini, Cook, and Jacobs (2004) argue that political
discussion constitutes “sharing of public life”; informal
talk about politics becomes a political act (Bennett,
Flickinger, and Rhine 2000; Pan et al. 2006). Vegh
(2003) proposes that there are progressive steps of online
activism, ranging from seeking and disseminating political
information and opinions to more radical forms of direct
action such as hacktivism. Similarly, a growing body of
research on online public opinion in China regards the
expression of political views online as online activism.
For example, in 2009 the Chinese Academy of Social
Science published a report on the growing challenge of
online activism in China. This report identiﬁes a “new
opinion class” made up of netizens who are concerned
with news and current affairs. These netizens express
their opinions online and “gather consensus, transform
emotions, induce action and inﬂuence society within a
very short period of time” (Xiao 2011, 221). Online acti-
vism in that sense is deﬁned as the expression of an
opinion on public affairs and participation in online poli-
tical discourse. In the context of the Internet the boundaries
between political talk and public opinion are blurred.
In this discussion about the rise of online public opinion
in China, we see a return to an earlier scholarly discussion
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that described the nature of public opinion as a mode of
communication. Today, public opinion is commonly
regarded as the aggregate of individual attitudes within a
particular social group whereby each individual’s attitude is
weighted equally (Converse 1987). Yet, before polling and
surveys became the predominant form of measuring public
opinion, researchers often described public opinion as a
communication process, blurring the boundaries between
public opinion and political participation. Allport (1937)
noted that public opinion requires the verbalization of opi-
nions on an issue widely known to a group of individuals
and that public opinion represents an action or a readiness
for action by individuals who are aware of others reacting to
the same situation. Davison (1958) described the rise of
such public opinion as a process that starts with the incuba-
tion of an issue in small group discussion and the emergence
of leadership that formulates and spreads the issue, inﬂuen-
cing the attitudes and behaviors of others. Through inter-
group communication it becomes known by a large number
of people, whereby the issue becomes public. A large num-
ber of people start to discuss the issue and form their own
opinion and adjust their behaviors based on expectation of
others’ opinions and behaviors. While they may set the
agenda in the process, they may also inﬂuence public opi-
nion by framing, priming, or persuading others. In response,
they might or might not take other political actions in order
to change policies. Much like Blumer (1948), Allport
(1937) and Davison (1958) understood public opinion as
part of sociopolitical processes, mirroring the organization
of society into social groups.
Interpersonal social networks play an important role in
the formation of an issue and the transmission of the issue to
a large number of people. Within social networks, acquain-
tances, corresponding to weak ties, are essential to exchange
important information (Granovetter 1973), because people
tend to know roughly the same as their friends, correspond-
ing to strong ties. At the same time, trust and loyalty
experienced in strong ties have the power to exert social
pressure and motivate people to become politically active
(della Porta 1988; Klandermans and Stekelenburg 2013). In
a closely knit network, people may choose to express
encouragement or approval in order to motivate friends
(Coleman 1990; Flache and Macy 1996). Messages can
spread quickly and become viral starting in strong and
weak social networks (Lotan 2011).
Opinion leaders or inﬂuencers play a strong role in the
emergence of information cascades, as suggested by
Davison (1958). A very small number of people who are
highly connected to others serve as hubs to spread informa-
tion (see, for example, Gladwell 2002). Those opinion lea-
ders generate information cascades online, but more
sporadically than is commonly believed. Newer and less
inﬂuential users can cause breakouts because of the subject
matter, topic, timing, format, and trustworthiness of the
message (such as video, image, news story, or petition)
(see, for example, Bakshy et al. 2011; Goel et al. 2016;
Lotan 2012). Overall, the emergence of information cas-
cades is highly unpredictable.
Mass communication has the advantage of expediting
information exchange and intergroup communication
(Davison 1958). The so-called “social affordance” literature
is concerned with the role of digital technology in changing
people’s communication behavior. Researchers have con-
vincingly shown that the Internet fosters the maintenance
of multiple communication streams with more diverse and
geographically distant people (Boase et al. 2006; Wellman
2001). Different authors suggest that the Internet is condu-
cive to the development of weak ties that provide opportu-
nities for people to expand disparate friendship and
organizational networks (Best and Krueger 2006; Hampton
2003; Haythornthwaite 2002; Kavanaugh et al. 2005).
These features facilitate the emergence of information cas-
cades in comparison to ofﬂine social networking.
We build on this discussion by specifying the technolo-
gical settings that create environments facilitating or hinder-
ing the emergence of online public opinion. Research on
political talk in small groups has demonstrated that the
circumstances within which discussion takes place have a
strong inﬂuence on online public opinion (see, for example,
Delli Carpini, Cook, and Jacobs 2004). Governments rely-
ing on participatory forms of governance for political deci-
sion-making strategize about how to best organize and
manage political discourse in deliberative settings (see, for
example, Lodge and Wegrich 2015). Because rational argu-
mentation, consideration of multiple viewpoints, and respect
between participants are by most scholarly accounts rare on
the Web, some online deliberative technologies have
emerged that are speciﬁcally designed to foster deliberation
deemed to be conducive to democracy (see, for example,
Freelon et al. 2012).
Our ﬁrst contribution in this article is to specify the
interactive features of the technological design in social
media platforms that may facilitate or hinder online public
opinion. Most observers would agree that online public
opinion originates in social media settings that are designed
by commercial companies. Users are paying for the service
of social media companies by providing the company with
their data created by the use of the service, which directly
translates into commercial income for the company. As a
result, incentives are built into the design of social media
platforms to increase the number of users and their level of
engagement. It is important to understand which incentives
companies aim to maximize when developing digital social
technology and how these create incentives to contribute to
online public opinion.
Our second contribution is to expand our understanding
of the actions that contribute to online public opinion. In the
discussion on information diffusion in digital social
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networks, scholars have focused on easily observable mea-
sures, such as retweets and likes (Cebrian, Rahwan, and
Pentland 2016). Yet simply forwarding a message does not
necessarily imply that a person agrees with the political
message. Instead, users express political views, such as
posting an original tweet, commenting on a message, and
forwarding a message with a comment. In addition to these
actions aimed at expressing opinions online, we also focus
on actions taken to engage more deeply with online infor-
mation, such as searching information as well as close read-
ing as opposed to simply skimming text. Compared to
similar ofﬂine behaviors, these actions gain greater partici-
patory quality in the online environment: “For news con-
sumption, the greater opportunities available in the online
sphere for individuals to seek out sources and share them
with others may also be leading to an ‘upgrading’ of this
mode of engagement into a more active participatory form”
(Gibson and Cantijoch 2013, 704–14). Such greater aware-
ness and reﬂection also contributes to the rise of public
opinion, as understood by Allport (1937) and Davison
(1958), though ultimately attitudes only become part of
online public opinion once they are expressed via text,
images, audio, or video ﬁles, creating content.
To show how technological design facilitates actions
aimed at deepening engagement with political informa-
tion (searching information, skimming text, close read-
ing of text) and at expressing opinion (posting,
commenting, forwarding with comments), we focus on
social media that are most likely to contribute to the rise
of online public opinion. Next we explain which spaces
for online public opinion exist in Chinese cyberspace
and why we decided to focus on WeChat, Weibo, and
Tieba.
CHINESE SOCIAL MEDIA AND SPACE FOR ONLINE
PUBLIC OPINION
Social media allow users to connect, communicate, and inter-
act with each other, often by posting, sharing, or co-producing
information (Correa, Hinsley, and Zúñiga 2010). These two
functions—social interaction and information-sharing—are at
the core of social media. We classify spaces for online public
opinion in Chinese cyberspace according to two dimensions.
The ﬁrst dimension relates to the degree to which individual
users or formal organizations, such as traditional media outlets
or state or party institutions, distribute information on the site.
The second dimension depends on how much reciprocity
between users supporting interactive conversation between
users, as opposed to one-dimensional conversation from a
sender to receivers, the platform allows. Space for online
public opinion can be mapped onto a two-dimensional con-
struct of social media (Figure 1).
In this two-dimensional space, news websites belong to
the bottom left, as journalists and editors of news websites
disseminate information as part of an organization. While
websites often allow users to comment on articles, users
usually do not interact with each other when commenting;
instead, the conversation is primarily between the news
agency as the sender and the user as the receiver, with
some opportunities to give feedback.
Wikipedia-like websites, such as Baidu Baike, the
Chinese version of Wikipedia, are located at the bottom
right, since all content on this type of websites is generated
by users. The similarity between Wikipedia-like websites
and news online portals is that they have limited features for
users to interact directly with each other. On Q&Awebsites,
such as Baidu Zhidao and Zhihu, users generate questions
Online deliberative forums
Communication
Source of information
One-way
Social interaction
Organization People
News websites
Wikipedia-like websites
Q&A websites
WeChat
Weibo or Baidu Tieba
FIGURE 1 The two-dimensional mapping of various Chinese online media.
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and answers; they can also comment and rate answers or
provide a better answer, which allows some levels of inter-
action between users. As such, these websites are also
located at the spectrum on the right but offer more recipro-
city between users than Wikipedia-like websites.
At the top left spectrum, we locate online deliberative forums
organized by governments or social organizations. Especially,
local governments utilize online space for public hearings to
obtain citizens’ feedback and complaints about policies (see, for
example, Zhang 2015). These online deliberative meetings are
organized by organizations and participants are allowed to input
their opinions directly onto the forums.
The top right of Figure 1 is the space for political
discussion we are most interested in, because most mes-
sages that become viral originate here, according to our
interviews. These social media platforms support reciprocal
conversation between users and offer users at least some
opportunities to become the source of information. Among
those sites, we focus on Sina Weibo, Baidu Tieba, and
WeChat as the three social media platforms with the largest
user base in Chinese cyberspace.1
Sina Weibo was initially a Chinese Twitter but later
started to incorporate more Facebook-like social features.2
Weibo is the only vibrant micro-blogging platform nowa-
days in China, with 175.7 million monthly active users.3
Baidu Tieba is a BBS-like chat forum with an average of 50
million new posts posted per day.4 WeChat, developed by
Tencent, is the most popular instant messenger in China,
with 500 million monthly active users.5 In contrast to QQ,
the other popular instant messenger developed by the same
company, WeChat is a mobile phone–based app. As such,
these three social media platforms provide three of the
largest spaces for informal political discussion in Chinese
cyberspace.
Weibo, WeChat, and Tieba vary in terms of the two
dimensions of online media. The Twitter-like Weibo offers
anyone the power to become the source of information,
including users and organizations, particularly traditional
media outlets. On Tieba, users are able to set up their own
group and attract other users who share similar interests by
sharing information. WeChat, on the other hand, emerged as
an instant messenger and therefore allows for a high degree
of social interaction between users, which can be in various
formats (namely, text, audio, video or picture) and in var-
ious settings (one-to-one or group chatting). In addition to
the instant messenger, WeChat also has a Facebook “wall”
called “Moments” that allows users to post content. But,
only links created by WeChat public accounts, various
online websites, or mainstream media accounts can be
shared. In order to generate public information that can be
shared on Moments, users need to open a public account,
which is open to both organizations and individuals. As the
platform facilitates a more formal organization of users into
public accounts, it is placed more toward the left spectrum
than Weibo and Baidu Tieba.
BUSINESS GOALS AND INCENTIVES BUILT INTO
SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMS
The Chinese state outsources the design of social media to
commercial companies, which makes politics by deﬁnition
harder to detect. In our conversations we focused on interac-
tivity as the deﬁning characteristics: social media allow users
to communicate and interact with each other, whereby infor-
mation (content and data) is generated.6 This language allowed
us to tease out key features of technological design that have
unintended consequences for online public opinion.
Social media companies have a great incentive to increase
interactivity, because interactivity is their source of revenue.
Most Chinese social media companies are based on business
models that generate income by using their data to target
advertising.7 The greater the data set of users and the more
active the users, the larger the income and potential proﬁt for
the social media company.8 As one senior product manager
put it, “Increasing number of users, increasing level of
inﬂuence,9 and increasing amount of revenue generated are
the three key purposes for every social media product.”10
Because of the commercial rationale for designing tech-
nology that increases the level of interactivity, product
managers designing the social media product start by draw-
ing on market research to understand the users’ needs and
demands.11 In his response to the question “What feature is
most important to interactivity,” an Android app designer
commented: “The most important point … is how to make
the feature satisfy users’ emotional need. It may be the need
to compete with others and to win. This emotional need is
always there, but the question is how to trigger this need of
users or how to gratify users’ vanity.”12 Such user needs can
range from social needs, such as, for example, attracting
others’ attention, gaining respect, being envied by others,
competing, and sharing,13 to information needs, such as, for
example, seeking information or knowing people who share
similar interests.14 Other social media also seek to be fun to
play with and to satisfy entertainment needs of users.15
Because we focus on social media that play an important
role in online public opinion, the needs that social media
experts identiﬁed as central to WeChat, Weibo, and Tieba
are seeking information, strengthening knowledge and
understanding, and gaining respect, as well as social needs
to develop and maintain social networks.
Social media experts emphasize that product managers
make a choice as to which user need to concentrate on when
designing the platform. We call those the platform’s core
functions, which are linked to user need. For example, a
market researcher at Weibo explains that Weibo is maximized
toward making people into the source of information; there-
fore, interactive technology strengthens information needs on
Weibo.16 In contrast, WeChat was designed to maximize the
maintenance of intimate social interaction between friends,
family, and acquaintances, satisfying social needs.17 Tieba
focuses on bringing people with similar interests together
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and promoting discussion within each interest group, which
places information needs at its core. When designing technol-
ogy, this core function forms the standard according to which
the company invests resources to develop the platform and in
terms of which the company measures its success in attracting
users and keeping them engaged with the platform.18
These examples reveal the commercial rationale behind tech-
nological design. None of the social media platforms we focus
on here are built with a political purpose in mind, but instead are
intended to satisfy certain user demands, broadly deﬁned. Below
we uncover how the incentives built into the technological
design ofWeChat,Weibo, and Tieba facilitate or hinder political
engagement and expression as one unintended way in which
users use social technology. To uncover these incentives, we
talked to social media experts about the platforms’ interactivity.
INTERACTIVE DESIGN OF WEIBO, WECHAT, AND
TIEBA
Interactivity served as a way for us to discuss politics with
project managers in an apolitical way. Building on research
by Sally J. McMillan and Jang-Sun Hwang (2002), we
asked social media experts about a platform’s responsive-
ness to messages and control of the user over the commu-
nication. These elements of a platform’s interactive
technological design enable us to assess how the platform
structures the communication process. Responsiveness and
user control aim to strengthen the platform’s core function.
According to social media experts, responsiveness captures
the timely and correct responses users receive either from
the system or from other users, while user control offers
users a sense of control over the social media platform and
the ability to perform certain tasks in line with the core
function.19 Next we explain how responsiveness and user
control ﬁgure into the structure of communication on
WeChat, Weibo, and Tieba, according to our interviews.
User Control
User control manifests itself in terms of choices that users
have over the social media platform (e.g., Laurel 1986,
1997). Weibo originally copied most of the choices for
users from Twitter, but has added additional choices to its
original design to accommodate trends related to its core
function. These choices are always made based on consid-
erations regarding whether they help users to become the
source of information and to manage the information they
receive. Weibo has a 140-word limit on tweets, enabling fast
dissemination and consumption of key information, while
also allowing users to attach long articles to a post in order
to better integrate bloggers as new sources of information.20
Users also can post pictures in their comments in order to
share information.21 Most importantly, Weibo users can
group the accounts they follow and view information by
these groups. From the Weibo manager’s point of view,22
this function is crucial for its core function as it helps to
reduce the information ﬂow for users, which tends to be
massive on Weibo. This function, technically speaking, is
not difﬁcult to develop. But both WeChat and Baidu Tieba
do not have this function, because seeking information is
only a secondary feature for WeChat, while information is
always contained and grouped within interest groups on
Baidu Tieba (see Table 1).
Compared to Weibo, Tieba focuses on seeking and gener-
ating information within interest groups, which manifests itself
in two key user choices, according to one Tieba product
manager. First, any user of Tieba can form a group and become
a group administrator in charge of managing a group. Second,
Tieba offers a unique design called “mezzanine ﬂoor comment
structure” (see Figure 2). In architecture, a mezzanine ﬂoor is
an intermediate ﬂoor between the main ﬂoors of a building and
is not counted as a ﬂoor. On Tieba it refers to all replies to a
comment appearing underneath a comment, instead of the
original post; and these replies are part of the comment they
TABLE 1
Level of Interactivity of Weibo, WeChat, and Baidu Tieba on User Control
Weibo WeChat Baidu Tieba
Core function Users as the source of
information
Promoting intimate social relationships Finding interest groups
Seeking and generating information ● Users can post content in
various formats including
long articles in addition to
the 140-word tweets.
● Users can post pictures in
comments.
● Users can group accounts
they follow and view infor-
mation by these groups.
● Users need to set up public accounts in
order to generate information that can
be disseminated.
● Anyone can set up a public account, but
each public account is allowed to post
once per day, regardless of the number
of articles per time.
● Users can form groups and become the
group administrator.
● Through the “mezzanine ﬂoor comment
structure,” users can easily engage in
discussion of sub-topics and create
further division of groups.
Social interaction ● Chatting is a button at the
bottom right of the ﬁrst
page, requiring one click to
open it.
● Limited chatting options.
● Chatting is on the ﬁrst page after log-
ging in.
● Various options to chat: text, voice, and
video.
● Private message box is one option on
the top right of the ﬁrst page, requiring a
few clicks to reach.
● Limited chatting options.
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are linked to. This unique feature aims to promote discussion
within interest groups and the development of subgroups and
new interest groups. Users can leave the current group and
form another new group based on shared interest.
In contrast to Weibo and Tieba, WeChat focuses on
maintaining intimate social relationships. WeChat does this
by offering users various options to chat, such as text, voice,
and short video. As a very popular feature, users can record
and send voice messages with a maximum length of one
minute each. When using WeChat’s instant messenger, users
can create different groups and have group chats. Neither
Weibo nor Tieba is able to compete with WeChat on this
aspect. “I think Weibo realized the importance of social
interaction and did develop some group chat functions
before; but the products containing social interaction func-
tions were not popular and failed in the end.”23 On Tieba,
users leave each other a QQ number or WeChat number if
they want to contact each other outside of the Tieba plat-
form. One Tieba product manager admitted that the social
interaction feature is not Tieba’s strength, but added, “We
should just continue with the current division of labor and
do what we are good at.”24
WeChat has limitations built into information sharing,
which mostly takes place via public accounts on Moments.
WeChat users gain access to public accounts via subscrip-
tion accounts (订阅号, Dingyuehao). “On Dingyuehao, the
list of public accounts is folded and users need to click on
the subscription accounts button to unfold the list. And each
public account is allowed to post once per day, although
there is no restriction on the number of articles each account
can post per time.”25As a professor in new media explained,
“WeChat does not want the user experience of social inter-
actions to be interrupted by the dissemination of public
information.”26
Overall, a formal and structural organization of informa-
tion is required for WeChat users if they want to generate
information that can be disseminated. In comparison, Weibo
and Tieba users enjoy more freedom to generate informa-
tion, but the difference between Weibo and Tieba lies in
whether information is organized based on the individual
user or the interest of a group of users. WeChat offers users
more options to interact with others socially.
Responsiveness
The relatedness of sequential messages is one important
aspect of responsiveness (Rafaeli 1988, 111). With regard
to social interactions, responsiveness is straightforward:
“When you ask a question, someone will answer it; when
you post a picture, someone will give you a thumb-up;
when you express a terrible experience you had, someone
will give you sympathy. This means that you can get what
you want immediately.”27 WeChat’s instant messenger
offers real-time one-to-one communication and group com-
munication and is therefore strong in this regard. If users
wanted to engage in one-to-one communication or a small
group chat on Weibo or Tieba, they usually move to an
instant messenger, even though Weibo and Tieba also offer
a private messenger as a feature, according to product
managers. As an associate professor in media and commu-
nication explained, WeChat “users can communicate with
others anytime and anywhere they want.”28 WeChat pro-
vides more responsiveness between users under the setting
for real-time communication.
Regarding information-sharing, however, WeChat is less
responsive compared to Weibo and Tieba. In forwarding,
the relatedness of sequential messages is largely maintained
on Weibo: users can forward posts along with any picture,
link, or video and subsequent comments about the original
post by others, as long as the post does not exceed the 140-
word limit. Tieba, on the other hand, uses the “mezzanine
ﬂoor comment structure,” which categorizes messages and
replies about the same issue into one group and increases
the relatedness of sequential messages.29 On WeChat, how-
ever, only links created by WeChat public accounts, various
online websites, or mainstream media accounts can be for-
warded, and the comments about the links by users’
FIGURE 2 Screenshot of the “mezzanine ﬂoor comment structure” on Baidu
Tieba (http://tieba.baidu.com/p/3845088799, accessed on March 17, 2017).
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contacts cannot be shared unless users manually copy and
paste the comments to the new posts.
Another important aspect of responsiveness is how
responsive the system is to the preferences set by the user.
As a marketing researcher of a social network site in China
mentioned,30 Weibo and Tieba both deliver posts that match
the user’s interest, while on WeChat Moments, posts are
ordered in chronological order, and on the subscription
accounts of WeChat, users just get what they subscribe to.
WeChat does not, for example, recommend public accounts
that match user’s interest.
The ﬁnal aspect of responsiveness is the speed of infor-
mation delivery. Public account users on WeChat are
allowed to post once per day, regardless of the number of
articles posted per time. In other words, information on
public accounts of WeChat is only updated once per day.
On Weibo and Baidu Tieba, there is no such restriction and
users can post as often as they want. Therefore, information
is more up to date on Weibo and Baidu Tieba.
As can be seen in Table 2, on seeking and generating
information, Weibo and Baidu Tieba are more responsive in
that they maintain the relatedness of sequential messages,
are responsive to a user’s preference when delivering infor-
mation, and allow timely delivery of information. Tieba
arranges information according to topics, while Weibo
arranges information according to users.31 WeChat, on the
other hand, is more responsive on social interactions by
allowing users to chat in real time.
Privacy Settings and Social Networks
As mentioned earlier, existing literature on social media has
mostly focused on how the structure of social networks
within social media platforms contributes to information
diffusion and public discourse taking place. Although our
focus here is on responsiveness and user control it is also
helpful to explain how digital technology manages the
structure of social networks via its public and private set-
tings (See Table 3).
Due to its emphasis on close ties in small groups,
WeChat restricts access to information based on the user’s
contacts. Information on Weibo and Tieba, however, is
accessible to any user of the platform. On Weibo, a user
can view posts by other users regardless of whether they are
friends with each other or not; unless a user sets restrictions
on who can view the posts, what the user posts is accessible
to any user on Weibo. The difference between Weibo and
Baidu Tieba is where information is located: information
posted on Tieba can be found within each interest group,
while information posted on Weibo is on each user’s own
page. Similarly, on WeChat, users can only interact with
their contacts, while on Weibo and Baidu Tieba, users can
interact with any user on the platform.
Decisions about which information remains private and
which is accessible to the public are closely linked to the
social networks of the platform: “WeChat is like a living
room and Weibo is like a square …: [on a public square]
everyone can voice their opinions regardless of whether
they know each other, while you will only invite people
who you know to your living room.”32 Tieba is a place
where people can ﬁnd others with similar interests; discus-
sions are arranged according to themes of interest and thus
contained within each discussion forum. As such, Tieba is
like a workshop for those who are interested in the topic and
others are free to join.33
INTERACTIVITY AND ONLINE PUBLIC OPINION
How do responsiveness and user control relate to the rise of
online public opinion? Here, we offer some preliminary
evidence based on qualitative interviews with 92 users,
TABLE 2
Level of Interactivity of Weibo, WeChat, and Baidu Tieba on Responsiveness
Weibo WeChat Baidu Tieba
Seeking and generating information ● Users can forward posts with any picture,
link, or video and subsequent comments
about the original post by others, as long
as it does not exceed the 140-word limit.
● System delivers posts or contacts that the
user may be interested in.
● Information can be delivered at any time
and in various formats and thus is fre-
quently updated.
● On Moments, comments by contacts can-
not be shared.
● System orders posts on Moments in
chronological order with the most recent
ones on top. On subscription accounts of
WeChat, users just get what they sub-
scribe to.
● On public accounts, each public account
is allowed to post once per day and thus
information is updated less frequently.
● The “mezzanine ﬂoor
comment structure”
arranges replies accord-
ing to discussion topics.
● System delivers the top
posts that match the
user’s interest.
● Users can post any time
as they want.
Social interactions Private chatting box is perceived by experts
as a failure in promoting real-time
communication.
Real-time chatting available. Private message box
functions more like an
email box; not
convenient for chatting.
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varying in terms of gender, education, age, and region.
Interviews with Internet users were conducted over two
periods—between January and May 2015 and between
October 2015 and March 2016.34 In our semi-structured
interviews we asked users how they used WeChat, Tieba,
and Weibo in order to talk to each other or share information
regarding politics.35
As explained earlier, when a concern or problem
emerges, the issue is ﬁrst discussed in a group that is
hospitable to it (Davison 1958). When discussion takes
place on WeChat’s instant messenger, the platform can
contribute to incubating an issue. A few interviewees
explained that when they ﬁnd interesting news or informa-
tion on WeChat, they prefer to share it with their friends
one-to one or within a group chat, instead of sharing it on
Moments.36 Because WeChat structures communication
within close networks, users express hesitation to voice
and discuss politics on Moments.
For example, a female interviewee explained that she
recently posted an original post about her positive views of
homosexuality onWeChatMoments, where shewas cautious to
express her view implicitly in the context of a movie calledBlue
Is the Warmest Color, a love story between two females.37
Instead of expressing her view directly, she related the movie
to an inﬂuential television program in China called Weirdo
Talk,38 in which mainstream views are challenged, and wrote
about the social implication of such movies and shows. “I have
relatives, friends, and colleagues from work on my WeChat
contact list, and I have to anticipate that all of themwill see what
I write. I need to keep this in mind when I write.”39 Asked
whether she was receiving the sort of comments she expected,
she replied: “There were very few comments and not a single
one joined the discussion. Even those few comments were
social comments, such as liking the post, or saying your new
proﬁle picture is beautiful, or comments like ‘homosexual
movie?’. But none of my contacts engaged in discussion
about the movie, about the social implications of the movie,
or about the development of Chinese society.”40 She felt that
comments and responses on WeChat are held hostage to social
politeness—that is, a person responds “not because I feel pas-
sionate to do so, but because I feel like I should.”41 Because of
the social politeness induced by WeChat’s focus on social
interactions between contacts, many interviewees perceive
WeChat as a tool for social communication and interactions, a
perfect substitute for the mobile phone message function,42 but
not for voicing and disseminating opinions.43
Tieba, by contrast, serves as an issue incubator for public
opinion. The ability of individual users to set up their own
interest groups and the unique “mezzanine ﬂoor comment
structure” facilitate the formation of issue publics. People
who ﬁnd out that they share similar views about an issue
can set up their own subgroups and continue further discus-
sion about the issue. Facts and opinions about the issue
concerned can be fully discussed and revealed in such a
group setting. Although Tieba is not designed for the pur-
pose of discussing politics, the group structure enables
heated discussion regarding any issues, including political
ones, and facilitates the formation of common opinions
within the group.44 In addition, setting up and managing a
new group on Tieba inevitably leads to the formation of a
group structure and group leadership, which facilitates the
emergence of leadership at the issue-formation stage.45 A
male Weibo and Tieba user explained the difference
between the two platforms as follows: “On Tieba, we gather
together because we all like, let’s say, a particular super star,
and we get to know all the information about him and
activities organized to support him. And members can inter-
act with each other, which Weibo does not have. I mean that
members can comment underneath the main post and there
is mezzanine ﬂoor comment structure that we can even
interact underneath a comment.”46 On Tieba he has a
sense of belonging to a group that has a structure and
whose members share common interest, while on Weibo
he does not have this sense of belonging. The sense of
belonging to a community or group is conducive to the
discussion and formation of opinions (Klandermans and
Stekelenburg 2013). For an issue to survive, to develop,
and to disseminate, small groups need to be hospitable to
the issue (Davison 1958) and act as “a radiating nucleus for
an idea” (Lasswell 1930, 187).
As compared to Baidu Tieba and WeChat, Weibo offers
users the power to be a source of information. It lacks the
group structure that can facilitate discussion of an issue
during the incubation stage, yet, it is the key venue for
discussion about an issue to transit from small groups to
become a topic for inter-group communication. In other
words, Weibo can turn an issue discussed in small groups
into a public issue. Several features of Weibo facilitate this
process. First, users have a wide range of choice over the
format of posts, and this facilitates the fast production of
information about the issue concerned in breadth. Second,
relatedness of sequential comments on Weibo facilitates the
discussion of the issue concerned in depth. Last but not
least, Weibo is accessible to the public and thus it is possible
to raise awareness of the issue among a large number of
people. The male interviewee mentioned above also pointed
out the ability of Weibo to turn an issue into a public issue:
“Information can spread very quickly [on Weibo]. For
example, as far as I know, most information about corrup-
tion and other negative news emerges as discussion topics
on Tieba; but this information can be shared and forwarded
TABLE 3
Privacy Settings of Weibo, WeChat, and Baidu Tieba
Weibo Baidu Tieba WeChat
Access to information Anyone Anyone User’s contacts
Access to social interaction Anyone Anyone User’s contacts
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by a signiﬁcantly larger audience in a very short time
through Weibo…. [On Weibo, for example] I want to record
an issue or publish a piece of news; and others might have
seen it and forwarded it; and this chain of forwarding the
post can go from one to ten, from ten to a hundred, and then
from hundreds to thousands of people. At the end, everyone
knows the issue. This is one reason why many people are
still using Weibo.”47 In other words, the ability of Weibo to
allow dissemination of information and opinions to a large
number of people in a fast manner is a key selling point of
Weibo, from the user’s perspective. The forwarding feature
on Weibo, as distinct from WeChat, contains sequential
comments about the original link or post, allowing the
dissemination of opinions, so that users get to see how an
idea is developed.
Compared to WeChat, Weibo offers greater publicness,
but it does not discourage political communication as
WeChat does on its Moments. This has to do with the social
networks created by the public and private settings of the
social media platforms. In a public venue, the majority of
the audience a speaker faces are strangers, while in a living
room a speaker faces visitors who know the speaker per-
sonally. As one interviewee put it: “Because [on Weibo]
strangers don’t know who I am, I don’t care what they
might think of me; it’s different on WeChat Moments,
where everyone knows who you are.”48
After an issue has been posted on Weibo, people might
circulate the information back to their social groups on
WeChat or Tieba, but the difference at this stage is that
the issue has become a public issue and is discussed in
many small groups instead of few groups at the issue-
incubation stage. Thus, Weibo serves as a key venue that
brings the issue to the attention of a wider audience and
fosters inter-group communication.
CONCLUSION
In the debate about the role of social media in authoritarian
states, cyber-optimists and cyber-skeptics have so far
focused on ways in which states censor and manipulate
this content, and ways in which users may undermine state
control. Instead of state regulations and the content of online
discussion, here we have focused on interactivity in order to
explore the various structures for political discussion that
are created by the technological design of social media
companies. This is an important dimension speciﬁc to the
Internet which facilitates certain kinds of actions taken by
users while limiting others. By comparing Weibo, WeChat,
and Baidu Tieba as the three social media with the largest
user bases in China, we have discovered that information
technology (IT) companies aim to attract speciﬁc kinds of
users by satisfying one very speciﬁc demand that users
have, such as spreading information, ﬁnding people with
common interests, or sustaining intimate relationships.
Every interaction the user has with the system or with
other users is optimized toward this one core function.
Core functions are kept as general as possible to attract a
large and active user base, as a large and active user base
directly translates into proﬁt for the IT company. Social
media are therefore rarely created with a particular political
purpose in mind.
While Weibo clearly has the greatest potential to facil-
itate the rise of online public opinion on politically rele-
vant topics, we should not underestimate the potential of
WeChat and Baidu Tieba for incubating issues and forming
opinions that are essential for public opinion to rise and for
mobilizing collective action. The group structure of Baidu
Tieba is conducive to the discussion of issues among
people sharing similar interests, and the formation of opi-
nions. The maintenance of groups on Baidu Tieba also
inevitably leads to the emergence of leadership, which is
also crucial for the rise of public opinion. But, given that
Baidu Tieba is arranged according to interest, some interest
groups are far more likely than others to stimulate public
opinion formation, especially those that deal with subjects
of public interest, such as health-related groups. Although
WeChat places restrictions on generating and disseminat-
ing public information, its social interaction feature
strengthens social bonds among people who already
know each other. Its real-time chat remains a powerful
venue for people to disseminate information, discuss
issues, and incubate opinions more privately, in small
groups. While both are limited with respect to their ability
to organize around political issues, there are also possibi-
lities. Baidu Tieba limits the creation of groups based on
what are considered politically sensitive topics, but politics
may pop up as a topic in groups that are organized around
a non-political interest. WeChat’s real-time chat can help to
address coordination problems, although there is a restric-
tion imposed on groups with more than 100 members. For
those larger groups, each member is obliged to link their
WeChat to a Chinese bankcard in order to join the group.
In other words, members of large group are required to
register with their real identities. While this makes it harder
for outsiders to observe political use, as compared to the
public forum Weibo, these social media still provide
opportunities for users with political motives to capture
the platform.
Social media companies in China are aware of the
possibility that some users may capture social media for
a political purpose. However, they are also aware that
social media differ in terms of their potential, depending
on the design. Among the three social media we study
here, Weibo is the only one that directly challenges state
autonomy over information, as it is designed to empower
users to become an information source and to spread
information online in a public forum and across social
media platforms. Not surprisingly, when asked which
social media facilitate online public opinion best, most
198 STOCKMANN AND LUO
interviewees state that no Chinese social media do that
except one: Weibo.49 Sina was able to create such a
platform because it could sell the idea that Weibo
would facilitate the guidance of online public opinion
by imposing a certain structure onto the discussion. An
analysis of online discussion on Weibo about an issue,
for example, can help Renmin Net to ﬁnd a way to
construct a positive post that guides online discussion
toward the direction favored by Renmin Net.50 Thus,
Weibo could both serve a commercial purpose and
simultaneously aid in guiding public opinion. Similar
arguments are frequently made by traditional media out-
lets that have to simultaneously serve the market and the
state (see, for example, Zhao 1998; Lee 2000;
Stockmann 2013). While social media are not created
with a political purpose in mind, commercial companies
seek frames that allow them to sell the concept of a
platform to the regime.
In addition to working together with partners in order
to actively shape online public opinion, social media
companies also build politics into the technological
design and management of content. Depending on the
platform’s potential to contribute to information cascades,
different strategies of censorship and control are built into
the platform. For example, on WeChat, it is difﬁcult to
spread information due to limitations imposed on the
number of people who can be added to a group. For
groups with more than 100 members, every member
needs to link their bank account with their WeChat. “It
is an act that requires you to submit some documentation.
Why? Because small groups have no impact [while big
ones do, and thus need to be registered].”51 In contrast,
“authorities only need to make sure that they control the
big Vs [on Weibo],”52 as they are inﬂuential in spreading
information and facilitating the rise of public opinion.
Tieba is characterized by a phenomenon called “Baoba”
(爆吧), which refers to users deliberately posting a mas-
sive amount of information within a short period of time.
This happens frequently when two Tieba groups disagree
with each other and continue to re-post information, using
insulting language. The Tieba product manager drew an
analogy of this phenomenon to protests: “In real life,
when people have grievances, they may use protests as
a means of expression, which is not allowed, and the
police take care of that. Similarly, on Tieba, we have
our rules and regulations [surveillance by machine or
human being to detect that kind of activity on Tieba] to
make sure that such activities do not ruin our user
experience.”53 These strategies remain speciﬁc to the
core function for which the platform was created.
Social media can be appropriated for political pur-
poses, and companies develop strategies to collaborate
with partners to actively shape online public opinion or
build in limitations to prevent information cascades.
While companies do not openly talk about the political
considerations informing digital intervention, it is likely
that broader trends in the political climate do play a role
when making decisions about product development. For
example, the space for media reporting undergoes cycles
of expansion and contraction depending on leadership
cycles. Weibo emerged at a time when the Hu–Wen
administration actively promoted public feedback
mechanisms for policymaking, at a time when the space
for media was relatively open, while WeChat emerged
shortly before a leadership transition, when the space
for media tends to tighten (Stockmann 2013). Despite
these broader trends that may inform the decision-making
of social media companies, we have not found evidence
that the Chinese state actively intervenes and promotes
certain social media platforms via regulations. It has been
speculated that a crackdown on opinion leaders (so-called
“Big Vs”) on Weibo has diverted some users to WeChat.
However, according to our interviews,54 Big Vs have
become more cautious and voice their opinions less fre-
quently as a result of the crackdown, which makes Weibo
less a platform with opinion leaders at its core than a
platform where content is mostly created by ordinary
users. The crackdown had a stronger inﬂuence on content
than on user numbers.
Overall, social media are primarily designed to attract
a large and active user base. With one core function,
social media can be appropriated for political purposes
by users. Platforms like Tieba and WeChat will not take
over the role of Weibo, simply because they were
designed to satisfy demands that do not directly challenge
the autonomy of the state over information. Despite the
hidden politics in technological design, political consid-
erations still enter the design of social media platforms as
commercial companies anticipate how technological
designs ﬁt with the broader strategy toward managing
online public opinion. By actively shaping and manipu-
lating the broader information environment, the govern-
ment can indirectly inﬂuence product design and facilitate
digital innovation to foster the power of online public
opinion or inhibit it.
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NOTES
1. QQ is another instant messenger designed by Tencent, just like
WeChat. We chose WeChat, because it is frequently mentioned in
the discussion about online public opinion in China and because of
its growing user base; as of June 2015 WeChat had 600 million
monthly active users and QQ 800 million. Interview with a market-
ing expert (73583), February 2015.
2. Interview with a Weibo product manager (75591), April 2015.
3. http://tech.sina.com.cn/i/2015-03-11/doc-iawzuney0631454.shtml,
accessed on May 28, 2015.
4. Interview with a Baidu Tieba senior manager (72906), April 15,
2015.
5. http://tech.sina.com.cn/i/2015-03-18/doc-icczmvun6903718.shtml,
accessed on May 28, 2015.
6. Interview with an Android app designer (77493), March 2015.
Interview with a Weibo product manager (75591), April 2015.
7. Interview with a Weibo product manager (75591), April 2015. For a
detailed explanation of how a user proﬁle can be drawn with the user
data, please see http://chuansong.me/n/696144, March 14, 2017.
8. A number of IT professionals we interviewed conﬁrmed this link
between interactivity and business interest among Chinese social
media. Interview with a Weibo product manager (75591), April
2015. Interview with a Baidu Tieba senior product manager
(72906), April 2015. Interview with an Android app designer
(77493), March 2015.
9. Here, inﬂuence refers to an increasing number of active users and
more actions performed by users, as the number of monthly active
users has been used widely by social media companies to indicate
their inﬂuence.
10. Interview with a Baidu Tieba senior product manager (72906), April
2015.
11. Interview with a product manager of a small social media company
specialized in photo sharing (76465), April 2015.
12. Interview with an Android app designer (77493), March 2015.
13. Interview with an Android app designer (77493), March 2015.
14. Interview with a Baidu Tieba senior product manager (72906), April
2015.
15. Interview with a marketing manager of a big social media company
in China (73583), February 2015.
16. Interview with a Weibo marketing researcher (73359), April 2015.
17. Interview with a marketing manager of a big social media company
in China (73583), February 2015.
18. Interview with a Weibo marketing researcher (73359), April 2015.
19. Interview with an Android App designer (77493), March 2015.
Interview with a Baidu Tieba senior product manager (72906),
April 2015.
20. Interview with a Weibo product manager (75591), April 2015.
21. Interview with a Weibo product manager (75591), April 2015.
22. Interview with a Weibo product manager (75591), April 2015.
23. Interview with a Weibo marketing researcher (73359), April 2015.
24. Interview with a Baidu Tieba senior product manager (72906), April
2015.
25. Interview with a Weibo product manager (75591), April 2015.
26. Interview with a professor in new media (75919), April 2015.
27. Interview with an Android app designer (77493), March 2015.
28. Interview with an associate professor in media and communication
(72286), April 2015.
29. Interview with a Baidu Tieba senior product manager (72906), April
2015.
30. Interview with a marketing research of a social network site in China
(79696), April 2015.
31. On Baidu Tieba, all replies to a comment appear as a part of the
speciﬁc comment, while on Weibo, only when two persons continue
to reply to each other underneath a post will the “view the commu-
nication” feature be available.
32. Interview with an associate professor in political science in China
(75154), April 2015.
33. Interview with an associate professor in social psychology (71963),
March 2015.
34. We selected interviewees using multiple entry points to decrease
selection bias in snowball sampling. Among the 92 interviewees,
42 are male and 50 are female; 39 were students at higher education
institutes. These students were selected from universities in Beijing,
Changsha, Guangzhou, Tianjin, Xiamen, and Zhangjiajie. In terms of
age, our sample consists of 54 interviewees younger than age thirty,
26 between thirty and forty-nine, and 12 between ﬁfty and seventy-
ﬁve. In terms of education, we have 59 interviewees with an educa-
tion of college level or above. Apart from 6 interviewees residing
overseas at the time of the interview, 86 interviewees were living in
cities or rural counties of ﬁfteen provinces or municipalities in China.
These include Anhui, Beijing, Fujian, Guangdong, Hainan,
Heilongjiang, Hubei, Hunan, Jilin, Shandong, Shanghai, Shanxi,
Shaanxi, Sichuan, Tianjin.
35. We conducted some interviews face-to-face and some by telephone.
We started the conversation with questions about media consump-
tion, followed by questions about seeking information about politics
and posting, sharing, or commenting about politics on the social
media platforms. In order to capture the meaning of politics in
China’s context we prompted users with three expressions referring
to politics: news and social hot topics (Shishi yu Shehui Redian 时事
与社会热点), political news and social hot topics (Shizheng yu
Shehuiredian 时政与社会热点), and major national affairs (Guojia
Dashi 国家大事).
36. Interview with 88206, February 2016; Interview with 80238,
December 2015.
37. Interview with 81738, January 2016.
38. Each episode of Weirdo Talk features a debate competition on a
chosen topic between two groups of debaters; it is renowned for
the wild and extreme arguments the players can make on the show.
39. Interview with 81738, January 2016.
40. Interview with 81738, January 2016.
41. Interview with 81738, January 2016.
42. Interview with 34884, February 2015.
43. Interview with 82206, December 2015; Interview with 80238,
December 2015; Interview with 89142, January 2016.
44. Interview with an associate professor of social psychology (71963)
and an assistant professor of political science (70696), March 2015.
45. Interview with a Baidu Tieba senior product manager (72906), April
2015.
46. Interview with 80643, November 2015.
47. Interview with 80643, November 2015.
48. Interview with 81402, January 2016.
49. Interviews with three academics studying social media, October
2014.
50. Interview with a Weibo product manager (75591), April 2015.
51. Interview with a former member of a provincial news center (70235),
April 2015.
52. Interview with a former member of a provincial news center (70235),
April 2015.
53. Interview with a Baidu Tieba senior product manager (72906), April
2015.
54. Interview with an associate professor in social psychology (71963),
March 2015.
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